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In his recent book, Loren K. Eiseley, a widely-known anthropologist asserts
that the standard rule of civilization can be stated in one phrase -- “Solutions
to problems create problems.,Tu With this attitude, Dr. Eiseley could be in-
serted into a farm policy discussion with no questions asked. For, indeed,
this sentiment neatly sums up much of this century’s farm policy experience
most nations of the world, including the United States.
An Overview
Though it is almost painful to restate it, let me briefly summarize my




the aggregate of all farm products increases slowly as population and incomes
expand both at home and abroad. Fueled by large doses of land-using and capital-
intensive technology, the supply of these products has increased rapidly,
especially since the 1930’s. The result, since the end of World War 11, has
been a long-term decline in relative market-clearing prices for the bundle
commodities which fill food and fiber needs. As the market-clearing price
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has fallen for these commodities and as technology has become more
capital-and land-using, much of the resulting pressure for adjustment has fallen
on the markets for labor. The lack of complete fluidity in these markets has
meant that returns for human inputs in the farming process have either fallen
or failed to rise as rapidly as returns for similar resources outside of farming.
Moreover, the pace and form of technological advance has fostered a substantial
increase in efficient farm size in most lines of production. This has driven
an ever-widening wedge between commercial farms
rural places of residence on which some farming
and smaller, less-productive
operations are conducted. Finally,
the low shortrun price responsiveness of both demand and supply provides the
potential for price and income instability around longer-term trends.
On one hand, we have benefited as a society from lower relative prices for
food and fiber. On the other hand, we have sustained the costs of poor re-
source allocation and widening income differentials between the farm and non-farm
sectors and within farming itself. In attempting to alleviate the basic problems,
we have evolved a
misallocation and
commodity market.
system of commodity programs which seeks to deal with resource
overproduction as they appear in first one and then another
Y In the markets for wheat, feed grains, and soybeans, re-
source abundance over time has shown itself (1) as less than “fair” market prices,
(2) as mounting stocks in the hands of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC),
(3) as idled acreage in voluntary land retirement programs, (4) as export
subsidies, (5) as confessional exports to food-short friendly nations, or (6)
as some combination of all these.
~ While it is true that increasing, but belated, attention is being paid to
rural poverty as a critical social problem largely distinct from commodity
problems, income support in rural America has long been tied closely to
commodity programs.-3-
To complicate matters, the growing importance of foreign markets for food
grains, feed grains, and oilseeds, and their products has provided a link be-
tween the farm problems and policies, of many nations. Consequently, farm
policy and program changes in, say, the European Community profoundly influence
the U.S. agricultural economy and vice versa. It is, therefore, no longer easy ——
to separate the farm problems of the United States from the farm problems of
Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and nations of the less-developed world.
The Commodity Proqrams
I will not attempt to trace the legislative or economic history of wheat,
feed grain, or soybean programs since the formative days of the old Agricultural
Adjustment Administration. But it is fair to say, however, that in the 1930’s
a link between agricultural market prices and income support was forged which
has yet to be completely broken. This link is weaker now than ever before, but
still intact.
Until the early 1960’s, commodity programs in wheat and feed grains featured
relatively high market price supports and relatively weak output restrictions.
The results were a visible, growing level of surplus stocks in government hands,
large export subsidies, and overseas export disposal efforts, especially for
wheat. Markets for soybeans and their products (especiallymeal) had been
growing rapidly -- at least as fast as adaptable resources released from wheat,
feed grains, hay, and cotton were flowing into soybean production. Until the
middle 1960’s, these resources were absorbed by soybeans with only occasional,
temporary accumulations of price support stocks... w . w . VW,
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J.. , tl-.e early 1960’s, a set of complex, voluntary acreage control programs
was introduced on a year-to-year basis for wheat and feed grains pending the
passage of more permanent farm legislation which, in the aspirations of then-
Secretary of Agriculture Freeman and his advisors, would contain more stringent
supply management features. When it became clear that political support for
such legislation was not sufficient for its passage and because the voluntary
programs seemed to be reasonably acceptable all around, the Food and Agriculture
Act of 1965 made these programs the keystone of farm price and income policy
for the rest of the decade.
Under these voluntary programs, cooperating producers agree to limit
acreage planted to the particular commodity to some fraction of an historically-
established allotment base. In return for production restraint through acreage
diversion, cooperators receive price support loans on actual output from per-
mitted acreage. In addition, program participants also are entitled to pay-
ments linked to their historical acreage base and~ in some years~ to payments
proportional to the amount of base acreage diverted away from production. The
former are called price support payments and the latter are called diversion
payrnents.z Non-participating farmers are not eligible for price support loans
or direct payments but are free to produce as much as they please, taking their
chances on the open market or feeding the produced grains to their livestock.
~ Direct price support payments for wheat now are made on the basis of the
share of the “normal” output of each allotment representing domestic
utilization (43 percent in 1969). For feed grains, the direct price





~.r. : ,: ~CS1Wi is flexible in that the Secretary of Agriculture can adjust$
fii~t~,~~~ limits, the loan rate, the qualifying diversion, and direct payment 1
provisions so as to tailor each annual program in line with the Administration’s
policy goals. A voluntary program of this type is, of course, expensive since
farmers must be induced to participate by economic incentives, no direct
penalties being attached to non-participation.
Without going into detail, it is clear that, until about the 1967 crop year,
the provisions of the voluntary programs were set so as to (1) encourage par-
ticipation, (2) divert substantial amounts of acreage from production and,(3) ,
,
through low loan rates, keep market prices from rising and thmeby permit re-
ductions of CCC inventories. So we traded surplus commodity stocks for idled
/
t
acres. In 1967, government wheat stocks were only 16 percent of their 1960-61
average level. Similarly, government corn stocks in 1967 were only 26 percent
of their 1960-61 average level. However, not all this stock reduction can be
,
credited to the voluntary programs. Domestic and export demand increased gen-
erally over the same period. In any case, at the beginning of the 1967 crop 6
year, something like 40-45 million acres stood idle as a result of the voluntary
wheat and feed grain programs. It was relatively costly to idle these acres
as anyone who has examined USDA budgets can
on acreaqe adjustment, the effectiveness of
continually eroded as technological advance
higher.
With the 1967 crop year, the voluntary
testify. Moreover, with the focus
any given level of diversion was
pushed average yields higher and
programs turned a corner from
acting as a continual brake on output to encouraging a modest expansion in
acreage and output. This reversal in emphasis occured because of the low levelsI
I
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..”-=----- ..c-=-”cc~ ~ ------ ,.. i-- from 1966 and because drought-induced crop failures in India
ar.delsewhere in 1966 sent food and feed grain prices soaring, touching off
world-wide fears of severe grain shortages and potential famines. In response,
both the wheat and feed grain programs were adjusted by the Administration to
encourage lower levels of diversion and somewhat larger output. Wheat production
jumped 16 percent in 1967 as the national acreage allotment was expanded by 16
million acres. Feed grain output expanded 12 percent as 15 million acres moved
out of diversion into production, figure 1.
Subsequently, larger grain harvests around the world in both developed and
less-developed nations eased the international food supply situation. Market
prices of both wheat and feed grains declined in 1967 and 1968,
stocks increased.
A similar drama was enacted with the soybean price-support
and government
loan and storage
program. The 1966 support rate was boosted by 25 cents per bushel to $2.50.
Market growth then slowed a bit as output expanded. In 1967 and 1968, soybean
stocks grew rapidly as market prices rested on support levels, figure 1.
Faced with growing inventories, the Administration tightened the wheat
program in 1968, in 1969, and again for 1970 to encourage more diversion and
less production. The feed grain program was readjusted to encourage more
diversion in 1968 and 1969. Soybean price supports were dropped approximately
30 cents per bushel for the 1969 crop year in order to discourage acreage ex-
pansion and to stimulate demand growth. ~
~ Thenominal decrease was from $2.50 to$2.25per bushel of soybeans. But
the grade to which the support refers was.changed from No. 2 to No. 1. An
average 5-cent per bushel premium is obtained for No. 1 beans, hence the
actual drop in support prices approximates 30 cents per bushel.:,
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he Food and Agriculture Act of 1%5, as extended, lapses in 1970. The
new Administration is developing and testing ideas for its legislative proposals.
Based on public statements by Secretary of Agriculture Hardin$ by his colleagues~
and from testimony presented to Congressional consnittees, we can identify at
least the general tone of the new comodity programs for feed grains, wheat, and.
soybeans. Y The final Administration
seems likely to. contain wheat and feed










matntain a system of direct payments in addition to price support loans
provide market price supports through loans in the neighborhood of
“world prices” (whatever that means) -- but generally around or lower
than current levels.
maintain ~creaae diversion as the principal element of production
restraint
permit slightly greater freedom for program participants in selecting
alternative crops for planting on non-diverted l creage.
continue a two-price system on the buying side for wheat used domestically
_ wheat exported.
place either a fixed direct payment limitation or a sliding scale con-
straint on large payments.
# I an not privy to policy deliberations of the Secretary’s office nor do I
have access to other than public information on new farm legislation.“9-
(8) give the Secretary of Agriculture substantial flexibility in deterr.i~.i~.~
t;”,e specifics of program provisions; including price support loan rates?
levels of direct payments, amount of diversion needed for program
participation, payment rates for additional diversion, etc.
For soybeans, I expect the new bill’s programs to:
(1) contain no direct restraints on production
(2) provide relatively low price supports, perhaps lower than at present
(3) continue substantial P.S. 480 exports of soybean oil
I consider it only an outside chance that soybeans will be drawn into the voluntary
program package with acreage diversion payments available for historical soybean
producers. The circumstances
soybean acreage increases for
year’s lower support prices.
surrounding such a move would have to include large
the 1970 crop and soaring CCC inventories at this
The potential time span of the 1970 bill ,hasnot, to my knowledge, been the
,“
subject of much public discussion yet. I conjecture that a four-year (or longe~)
commodity program bill is not likely if any really new or different measures are
adopted. More likely, in my view, is that the 1970 bill will be a rather short-,
term one, not because it is radically different, but because a major congressional
floor debate will occur in connection with the legislation over issues like food
stamps and malnutrition, agricultural pollution, consumer protection~ farm labor~
andy or course, payment limitations.
In summary then, I think that the highest probability exists for rather
short-term voluntary wheat and feed grain programs roughly similar to those now
in force. The similarity will be in both economic effects and treasury cost.4 ‘/
-1o-
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like “set Aside: and “Domestic Allotment” come into vogue. The major changes
will involve payment limitationsand added freedom for producers to choose
among alternative crops and still participate in programs. Soybeans likely
will remain outside the voluntary program umbrella.
Program Choices
It does not seem worthwhile for me to lay out and critically analyze the
economic effects of the several broad categories of commodity policies which
are possible! including the free market alternative. First of all, a sub-
stantial return to free markets for corn and wheat has been virtually ruled
out by current Administration proposals. The simple price-support loan,
storage? and export disposal alternative was abandoned after the experience of
the 1950’s as too costly both financially and politically. The more stringent
supply management approach was smothered in its crib in 1963 having been judged
not politically feasible. Land retirement, especially massive land retirement
on a scale sufficient to deal with commodity problems, has been treated dis-
dainfully by Congress and by most (but not all) rural-based interest groups.
The Conservation Reserve portion of the 1956 Soil Bank Act and the Cropland
Adjustment Program of the 1965 Act were only modestly funded.
Voluntary programs featuring direct payments for compliance and some
form of the two-price mechanism seem to be the only feasible alternatives
open at the moment. These programs offer both a practical and a theoretical
compromise among the mutually exclusive objectives of (1) higher net farm
income, (2) lower treasury costs, (3) lower food and fiber prices, and (4)
more optimal resource allocation. This is not to say that voluntary programs.
-11.-
sf production restraint are with us forever, or that the general approaches
now discarded might not be resurrected someday.
Fertile minds may devise new approaches, but it is unlikely that they
will involve totally new or totally agreeable ways of dealing with the abundant
(or redundant) productive resources locked into the cash crop sector of our farm
economy. The best that we can hope for at the moment is to encourage continuation
of the adjustment process without an abrupt plunge to the free market allocation
mechanism. We probably will continue to redistribute a portion of the national
income to those excess resources through direct payments for program compliance.
At the same time, I also feel that we soon should evolve a sizeable effort to
reduce and alleviate conditions of rural poverty which are not touched by
commercial farm programs and commodity policies.
Proqram Improvement
If it can be agreed that voluntary programs for output control are the most
feasible and likely alternative until further notice, then we, as interested
citizens, are free to offer suggestions on how they could be improved. The
following, briefly stated, are my recommendations. These notions flow from my
view of the overall farm problem as it is reflected in the wheats feed grainj
and soybean sectors.
First and most important, in my opinion, is that the major annual provisions
of these crop programs must be determined as simultaneously as possibles es-
pecially those for wheat, corn, soybeans and cotton. The excess resources
which the programs are trying to contain can adjust and flow at the margin within.. .
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agriculture so that a miscalculation in one commodity can spill over and undermine
the objectives of other programs. The’day seems to be gone when an imbalance
between the wheat, corn, or cotton programs can be largely absorbed by a
growing and expanding soybean economy.
the
the
Corn policy is the linchpin of the system. It is the major link between
crop and livestock economy; it is the program which most importantly affects
agricultural heartland of the nation; and it is the program to which each
of the others has its most direct economic link in terms of resource adjustments.
For instance, as long as soybean output is not restricted, the decisions on corn
supports and diversion are the crucial factors determining whether a given soy-
bean price support loan rate will generate more carryover stocks, clear the
annual market, or permit a reduction in carryover. One could discuss these inter-
relationships in much detail, but this example makes the point.
Next, is the continued and heightened recognition that policy makers must
give to the crucial importance of export markets. Last year, 39 percent of our
soybeansj 34 percent of our wheat, and 12 percent of our corn went abroad.
These figures vary from year to year, sometimes widely, as supply, demand, and
v
political factors change for both our overseas customers and our competitors.
Since we often have little or no control over these changes, they can produce
instability in our own markets and programs. Yet we must move carefully in
commodity policy decisions since our exports make up a large share of the world
trade in wheat (36 percent in 1968), soybeans (90 percent in 1968) and feed
~ The participation of the United States in the International Grains Arrange-
ment is a fascinating and complex question, but beyond the scope of this
paper.-13-
;rains (4c percent in 1968). Hence, our program changes can substantially alter
prices, incomes, and foreign exchange earnings for many nations.
My next suggestion is that now might be a good time to drop national acreaqe
allotments and bases and adopt a system of base quantities of the commodities
for program purposes. The allocation of alloLment quantities could be carried
right down to the farm level but then translated into annual acreage equivalents
using an appropriate local yield figure. Employing allotment quantities for each
individual farm as the basis for voluntary program benefits would be difficult since
(1) some wheat and much feed grains are consumed by livestock on the farms where
produced, and (2) the voluntary nature of program participation would make it
possible for “participants” to market excess production through non-participants.
However, the allotment quantities could be attached to individual farms and annual
acreage calculationsmade for compliance-monitoringpurposes. Erosion of the
effectiveness of given treasury outlays would still occur as technological
advance improves the productivity of all resources.
decisions would not have to be made with a measuring
tinually changing. This sort of policy change might
land values of farms now holding acreage allotments.
However, policy and program
device whose size is con-
have substantial impact on
This
thoroughly, but need not render such a change impossible.
Allotments and bases, whether in acres or quantities,
should be investigated
could be made more
transferablewithin and between states. This would be consistent with the
Administration’s announced objective of more freedom for decision-making. Sales
and transfers of allotments could aid in improved resource allocation. To pre-
vent allotments from being accumulated by units judged to be “too large”,,*
,’
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restrictions on allotment purchases could be invoked. Similarly, to protect
rural communities, the rate at which allotments leave a given county also could
be controlled.
I have a few more general, but miscellaneous, suggestions concerning new
commodity legislation:
1. I agree that it is a good idea to drop the linkage between commodity
support prices and our traditional parity calculations, as the Admin-
istration proposes. But it would be a mistake to become locked into
a rigid moving-average calculation based on so-called world prices.
First of all, any price analyst can tell you that moving averages of
past prices will lag behind any change in the general trend. Secondly,
world price levels for wheat, feed grains, and cotton are really the
net effect of our own programs and policies balanced off against those
of other major trading nations, with no necessary attachment to real,
underlying economic relationships. Considerable study should go into
this question.
20 Though I think it unlikely, I recommend that a much more permanent
commodity bill be enacted. My ideal basic program law would run per-
haps 8-10 years with provision for 2 or 3 major appropriation bills
during that period. This would have the dual advantage of giving
these programs a real test and, at the same time, freeing valuable
Administration and Congressional resources for the consideration of
other vital problems which now torture rural and urban America.
3. Finally, it should be mandatory that any new program, no matter how
complex at the administrative level, should be made simpler at the-15-
farm level. I doubt that many Midwestern farmers whose production
alternatives include wheat> corns barley? and soybeans can make more
than an approximate evaluation of the profitability of possible al-
ternatives available to them from the welter of present options and
regulations.
Conclusion
Consider again Loren Eiseley’s profound
create problems.” I have no doubts that our
agricultural problems will continue to cause
thought, “Solutions to problems
efforts to find solutions to
new problems. Hopefully, the new
problems will be of a smaller order of difficulty than the original ones. But
permit me to suggest a modest corollary to this rule, “important problems for
which no solutions are attempted hardly ever go away by themselves.”